The debate about the moral status ofthe embryo has gained new impetus because of the advances in reproductive technology that have made early human embryo experimentation a possibility, and because of the public concern that this arouses. Severalphilosophical arguments claiming that fertilisation is the event that accords moral status to the embryo were initiallyformulated in the context of the abortion debate. Were they formulated with sufficientprecision to accountfor the scientificfacts as we now understand them? Or do these arguments need modification? Aspects ofthree argumentsfor moral status being acquired atfertilisation are examined in relation to current scientific knowledge, highlighting the reasons why such arguments, atpresent, seem to provide an inadequate basis for the determination of moral status.
Advances in reproductive technology have made it technically possible for the early human embryo to be an experimental subject. This has enlivened debate concerning the moral status of the prenate (1), for some consensus on this issue is essential for policy formation aimed at regulating the future of such research.
Within the context of the abortion debate, various landmarks in prenatal development are nominated as the determinant of full moral status. Developmentally the earliest of these is fertilisation (2) . This paper examines some of the arguments for claiming that fertilisation is the basis for full moral status in the context of current scientific knowledge. Have these arguments been stated with sufficient precision to cope with the facts as we now understand them? Do they need to be modified and if so, howtnight this be done? But before these questions can be considered some understanding of fertilisation itself is necessary.
What is fertilisation?
Human fertilisation is a complex process requiring about 24 hours for completion. Viewed begins with a spermatozoon, the male gamete, penetrating the ovum or female gamete and culminates in the mingling of the genetic material from each to form a single-celled zygote.
Historically, fertilisation was believed to be possible only in the uterine or fallopian tubes of the female, but recent medical advances resulting in many births world-wide, have demonstrated that in vitro fertilisation is also possible (3) . Regardless of the location of the process, its biological consequences are the same: fertilisation restores the diploid chromosome number, enhances genetic variation, results in sex determination and is a necessary prerequisite for embryogenesis to proceed (4).
Fertilisation and moral status: the arguments examined
Arguments in support of fertilisation as the time at which full moral status is acquired either rely solely on features of the fertilisation process, or on some of its aspects in combination with an emphasis on the potential of the newly-formed entity. Those arguments depending on potential have been considered elsewhere (5), so the focus here is only on those arguments that rely on features of the fertilisation process. For the purposes of discussing the relevant biology, these arguments can be considered as three major types: the genetic argument, the discontinuity/ continuity argument and the individuality argument.
The genetic argument
In essence, this approach pin-points fertilisation as the time at which moral status is acquired as it is then that entities that 'are genetically human beings' (6) are created. For this argument the crucial event during fertilisation is the formation of a human genotype. It is claimed that only at fertilisation, and not before, does a new genetic member of the species Homo sapiens come about, and at no other point in development is there any 'significant' (7) genetic change. This claim is often coupled with the basic moral principle that it is wrong to destroy innocent human beings which, if taken to include the zygote, leads to the conclusion that it is wrong to destroy early human life from the moment of fertilisation (8) .
Biologically, this view raises two major questionsfirstly, what constitutes the state of being genetically human and secondly, what is meant by a significant genetic change?
Taking the first question: the genome or genetic make-up of an organism may be considered at three levels -the comparatively gross level of the chromosome, the level of the gene itself and the even finer level of the molecular structure of the gene. Ifthe condition of being genetically human is considered chromosomally, it is either implicit or explicit (9) (11) and in vitro as many as 8-10 per cent of fertilisations can be observed to result from the penetration of more than one sperm (12) . The majority of triploids are spontaneously aborted or still-born but there are some reports of live-born individuals who have lived for up to seven months after birth (13) .
More common conditions showing a variation in chromosome number and accompanied by much longer life-spans include Triple-X females (about 1/ 1500 live female births), Klinefelter's Syndrome (about 1/500 live male births) and Down's Syndrome (about 1/500 live births) which are usually associated with 47 chromosomes in the karyotype. In contrast to this range of disorders, postnatal existence with only 45 chromosomes is more limited. Turner's Syndrome is the only such chromosomal condition in humans in which one chromosome may be completely absent. The affected females (about 1/4500 live female births) are missing an X-chromosome from the genome (14) .
The incidence of these chromosomal conditions at birth is very much lower than at fertilisation, for it is estimated that more than 90 per cent of them are lost through very early pregnancy loss and later spontaneous abortion (15) . (18) .
Adoption of the claim of Noonan (19) that: '...if you are conceived by human parents you are human' may be seen as a possible means of circumventing the difficulties in defining a genetic human being. In the light of recent advances in in vitro fertilisation (IVF) this approach raises the question: If you are conceived by IVF-procedures, from human material, do you still qualify as human? An affirmative answer here surely suggests that the origin of the material rather than any of its characteristics is what is important for specifying a human being. However, even this possible solution may be short-lived, for it relies on species breeding true to their kind. But consider the situation of transgenic animals.
A transgenic animal is one carrying a gene from another species, such as a mouse with a gene from a human source (20) . How many human genes can be introduced into a phenotypic mouse before it is considered as genetically non-mouse or even human? Is it the intra-uterine existence of the entity within a mouse that ensures that such a transgenic animal remains a mouse? Alternatively, would the introduction of a gene from an animal into a human gamete or early embryo, say for the purposes of gene therapy, invalidate the humanity of any offspring produced subsequently? What if many animal genes were to be introduced? The advent of transgenic animals blurs the boundaries of the intended meaning of species as 'a discrete breeding unit' and emphasises the need for criteria other than those of the genetic content and its origin, and the site of fertilisation being applied in attributing human, and hence moral, status to the prenate. The The discontinuity-continuity argument Proponents of this argument (25) view events postfertilisation as comprising a continuum of developmental changes, such that it is impossible to isolate any one stage at which to attribute the attainment of moral status. In contrast to this continuity, fertilisation is seen as a radical discontinuity or 'transformation' (26) in development. It is then argued that the union of the two gametes to form the single zygote at fertilisation is the only discrete stage at which it can be claimed that a human entity begins to exist.
Emphasis for this interpretation of continuity, known as numerical continuity, is on the change from two gametes to one zygote that is continuous throughout all following development (27) . As previously mentioned, in the formation of triploid individuals more than two entities may sometimes participate in fertilisation. A further deviation of this occurs with parthenogenesis -development of the egg without fertilisation by a sperm. At present this holds only little relevance to human reproduction, as so far as is known no births have resulted from this process, although the initial stages of parthenogenetic development have been observed rarely in vitro (28) . Here, there is no numerical discontinuity unless, as suggested by Quinn (26) the environmental agent inducing parthenogenetic development is treated as a pre-fertilisation entity that is incorporated into the 'zygote' at the onset of development. But this approach implies that environment is irrelevant in the events of normal fertilisation, which leads to an arbitrary and unsatisfactory distinction not reflecting the actual course of events.
Dispermy and parthenogenesis represent different deviations in the number of entities participating in the process leading to the initiation of development which may be able to be incorporated into the notion of numerical continuity. But even if these fluctuations are accepted, the notion also specifies that the result of fertilisation is the formation of a single entity -the zygote. Is this necessarily the case?
Consider the outcome of dispermy. If dispermy occurs it may predispose to a tumorous condition known as a hydatidiform mole (29) . In such an event embryonic development may not occur. The medical concern with the formation of moles is that they may become malignant and life-threatening for the mother, but here they serve as an example of how fertilisation may not necessarily lead to the formation ofa zygote. Now, consider again the outcome of fertilisation. The one zygote present in the context ofthis argument, is said to mark the beginning of a human entity that is numerically continuous throughout all subsequent development. Is this the case? What if the zygote should split soon after its formation? Can the notion of numerical continuity cope with the possibility?
Identical twins arise from a single zygote that splits. The mechanism involved is not important here, the point is that with this type of twinning there is only temporary numerical discontinuity, ie 1 egg + 1 sperm -> 1 zygote --2 individuals. In trying to make numerical continuity allow for twinning Quinn (26) concluded that identical twinning, if environmentally determined, was a developmental abnormality. Such an approach is analogous to that used when attempting to reconcile parthenogenesis with numerical continuity for the net result is to discount any possible role environment may play in singleton zygote development. At present, the relative contribution of genotype and environment to identical twinning is unclear. Identical twins occur in about one of every 270 pregnancies coming to term (4), and it has been observed that a proportion of identical twins are lost either through spontaneous abortion (30) or the loss of one fetus which results in singleton development and birth (31) . Further studies of twins during gestation may show identical twins to be more frequent than currently believed. The techniques for such studies to proceed are now becoming available and if a genetic component to identical twin formation could be demonstrated their status, as seen by Quinn, as a 'developmental abnormality' would need reappraisal.
The concept of numerical continuity is too narrow as initially defined to allow for any variations during or subsequent to fertilisation. To be ranked as a valid determinant of moral status some refinement of the concept, incorporating current scientific knowledge is needed.
The individuality argument
Proponents of this argument also claim that fundamental moral principles against killing are applicable from fertilisation, as this event marks the time when an individual human being begins to exist. (33) .
The problems with these views have largely been discussed. The genotype of an individual later in life is not necessarily that formed at fertilisation; many changes can occur subsequently. Similarly, the individual created at fertilisation may not remain the same throughout life. The simplest demonstration of this is identical twinning which is possible for about 12 days after fertilisation. In this process the original zygote ceases to exist. Conversely, during this time it is also possible for two zygotes derived from the independent fertilisation of two eggs to fuse forming a chimera -the one individual resulting from two fertilisation events. In neither of these cases is the developing individual the one that was formed at fertilisation.
Other authors appeal to the potential ofthe zygote:
'We know that a new human individual organism with the internal potential to develop into an adult . . . comes into existence as a result of the process of fertilisation . . .' (34) .
The intention is not to discuss potential here. However, consideration of this argument does illustrate one feature inherent in many arguments in support of fertilisation: a reliance on the viability of the zygote. It is worthwhile noting that for up to 78 per cent of human fertilisations the end-point is loss (35) This process is seen as marking the beginning of a human life, and thus determining that fertilisation is the time at which moral status is accorded. The point of whether or not fertilisation is the beginning of human life will not be debated here. Leaving this aside, it seems that overall the different arguments for fertilisation determining moral status of the prenate oversimplify actual biological events.
Among the problems encountered are an overemphasis on the role of genetics in directing the course of events after fertilisation, and a dependence on the fidelity of the new genotype formed at fertilisation throughout all subsequent development. Also sometimes inherent in this argument is the assumption that birth will follow from fertilisation. Several instances where biology diverges from these claims have been discussed and many more equivalent examples could be cited.
When assessing the claim that fertilisation establishes full moral status, several facts should be kept in mind:
1) Given suitable environmental conditions, development may sometimes commence without fertilisation occurring (parthenogenesis).
2) The genotype of any individual may not be that formed at fertilisation. 3) Development and differentiation after fertilisation result in changes to the genetic complement of the prenate. 4) Environment is a potent force in the course of development both prenatally and postnatally. 5) The formation of a single zygote at fertilisation may be the forerunner of the development of multiple individuals that may or may not be genetically identical. 6) Successful completion of fertilisation in no way assures development through to birth or even the commencement of embryo development. Until arguments claiming fertilisation as the determinant of moral status take into account such facts by being modified to incorporate them, they provide an inadequate basis for policy-formation or legislation regulating reproductive technology as they hold only little relevance to actual biology, Presently, this situation serves to raise the questions of whether the whole issue of moral status needs reappraisal and whether any legislation, either actual or proposed, in this area is premature.
York: Academic Press, 1977. (22) Much of the DNA in humans is apparently never used for the production of proteins (the usual gene product) and so spontaneous mutations in this genetic material will have no effect on the phenotype of the organism. Also, the genetic material that is read for protein production is read as a triplet code and the code is such that any mutation in the third base of a triplet will not always affect the protein being produced. In contrast a mutation in the first or second positions of a triplet may have a range of effects on the protein being produced, and may even stop its production. (23) Some genes are only functional at certain stages of development and once that stage is past remain switched off. One instance of this is in the production of human haemoglobin where different clusters of genes are active during the embryo phase, fetal phase, and child and adult phase. Mutations during adult life in the embryo phase gene complex would have no effect on the adult, as these genes are then inactive. (24) Mutations are of various types -deletion, insertion, base substitution, inversion and duplication -which may involve only small regions of the genetic material. There are also relatively large-scale structural changes such as transposition, inversion, translocation and duplication which have major effects on the function ofthe genome.
